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NOTES
THE EXEMPTION STATUS OF THE BONA FIDE
PLEDGEE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF i933*
"XBANK accepts as security for a substantial loan to Corporation Y
bonds issued by Corporation Z, controlled by Y. The loan, it is assumed,
is made in good faith, with no purpose of effecting any distribution of the
pledged bonds. The note or instrument of pledge contains a provision
empowering X, in the event of default on the loan, to sell the pledged
bonds privately or publicly for account of Y, applying the proceeds
toward the payment of the loan and returning to Y any sums remaining
after the payment of the expenses of sale. A default occurring, X de-
sires to sell the bonds, and enters into negotiations with B, an investment
banking house, for the sale of the bonds to it, B proposing to organize
a group of dealers to act as a selling group in the disposition of the
bonds. Despite the default, X is not in control of Y and cannot compel
registration of the bonds by Z. May Z, by its refusal to register, pre-
vent disposition of the bonds by X except in a non-public offering?" '
With this example a former General Counsel of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and his associate early illustrated a problem of
interpretation which then lay latent in the term "underwriter," as used
in the Securities Act of 1933.2 Is a bona fide pledgee who undertakes a
*This note was written during the summer of 196o by a student who was then
a law clerk in the Oflice of the General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publica-
tion by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the staff of the Commission.
1 Throop & Lane, Some Problems of Exemption Under the Securities Act of z933, 4
LAW & CONTEMp. PROB. 89, 124 (1937). (Emphasis added.)
'The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a
(1958), requires the disclosure of pertinent business and financial facts in connection with
the public offering of securities so that investors will be provided with the means of
reaching an informed judgment as to the investment merits of the security. Before an
issue of securities may be offered to the public a registration statement must be filed with
the SEC. Section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958), is the statutory medium for restricting
offerings to those made in accordance with the disclosure standards of the Act. Unless
a registration statement has been filed with the Commission, it is illegal to offer to sell
a security5 unless a registration statement has become effective, it is illegal to sell or
deliver a security. The prohibition of § 5, by its terms, encompasses any offer, sale, or
delivery after sale of a security.
Section 4(), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 d() (1958), exempts certain transactions from the
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public sale of pledged securities an "underwriter," thereby subjecting
the sale to the Act's registration requirements? This question, in sub-
stance though not in form, at last reached an appellate court; in May
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided SEC v. Guild Films
Co.3
This case did not involve a bona fide pledge, where the lender takes
securities as collateral to secure a loan which the debtor plans to pay at
maturity and which the lender can reasonably expect will be retired.4
Still, this most important of the eleven circuit courts of appeals as far as
securities law interpretation is concerned in effect held that "good faith"
is irrelevant to the purpose of the statutory exemption, as the court has
registration requirements where, as the Congress stated, ". . . there is no practical need
for . . . [the bill's] application or where the benefits are too remote." H. REP. No.
85, 7 3d Cong., ist Sess. (1933), P. 5, to accompany H.R. 5480, which became the
Securities Act. The first clause of § 4() thus exempts "transactions by any person
other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer." "Underwriter" is broadly defined in
§ 2(), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 b(ix) (1958), as follows:
The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribu-
tion of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in
any such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or
indirect underwriting of any such undertaking ....
1279 F.2d 485 (zd Cir. 596o), cert. denied, 29 U.S.L. Week 3099 (U.S. Oct. Ii,
196o), affllrming 178 F. Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
' In September 1958 Hal Roach, Jr., obtained a short term loan of $12o,ooo from
two California banks, depositing as collateral stock of a company of which he was a
controlling stockholder. When this stock dropped in value as a result of having been
suspended from trading on the New York Stock Exchange, the banks in December
1958 demanded payment of the loan. Roach was in financial difficulty. For nearly two
months the banks attempted unsuccessfully to obtain satisfaction of the loan before
again demanding payment, this time by February 3. Then, two days before un-
registered Guild Films stock was even issued to Roach, who represented to the company
that the shares would be taken for investment and not for'distribution, Roach promised
to deliver to the banks, purportedly as collateral, a certificate for 5o,ooo shares. On the
very day the certificate was received, the banks notified Roach that the Guild Films stock
would be sold if the loan were not paid by February 16, as the original securities were
now valueless having also been barred from trading in the over-the-counter markets.
This the banks undertook to do, until the SEC caused temporary restraining orders to
issue.
Thus, the banks realized at the time they accepted the stock that whatever recovery
they were to get would come from its distribution. The district court reached the
"ultimate conclusion" that this "was not a pledge transaction at all" and that when the
banks received the Guild Films stock from Roach they were "no longer looking for or
hoping for payment from him." 178 F. Supp. 418, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). The
Court of Appeals itself stated that "the banks should have known that immediate sale
was almost inevitable if they were to recoup their loans from the security received." 279
F.zd 485, 490 (2d Cir. 196o).
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interpreted over the years the congressional mandate of disclosure to
investors.
The Second Circuit divided when it first considered twenty years
ago whether the statutory term "underwriter" should be interpreted
broadly or narrowly. Leaving no room for misunderstanding, however,
two of the three judges in SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benev. Ass'n" limited
the section 4(1) exemption to trading transactions between individual
investors with relation to securities already issuedi the court thus held
that 4(I) was not intended to exempt distributions by issuers. Irre-
spective of whether one is an "underwriter," the exemption is unavail-
able to him if he engages, in violation of section 5, in transactions in
which an issuer is distributing securities. In Augustus Hand's plain
language:
[Section 4(1)] does not in terms or by fair implication protect those who are
engaged in steps necessary to the distribution of security issues.'
The breadth of the statutory policy of investor protection for which
Chinese Consolidated thus stands, and conversely the narrowness of the
4() exemption, were reaffirmed without dissent in SEC v. Cul pepper7
by a different panel of judges than were to sit one year later for SEC v.
Guild Films Co. In Culpepper the court restated its earlier holding that
section 4(1) was not intended to exempt distributions by issuers, and
extended it to "cts of other individuals who engage in steps necessary
to such distributions, even if such individuals themselves do not come
within the definition of 'issuer, underwriter, or dealer.' ,, The court
then held that a broker who purchased from other brokers unregistered
shares which he resold violated section 5 because he "consciously en-
gaged in steps necessary to the consummation of the public distribution
of shares by the issuer." He could not invoke the exemption provided
by section 4(I).
When the SEC entered the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York and obtained, after hearing, a preliminary injunction
against the sale by two California banks of unregistered Guild Films
12o F.zd 738 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 6x8 (x94,).
' SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benev. Ass'n, supra note 5, at 741.
270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d
461 (2d Cir. 1959), where this court held that resales of unregistered securities by a
firm that had acquired the securities ten months earlier with the intention to retain the
securities only if the issuer continued to operate profitably rendered the firm ail under-
writer.
S SEC v. Culpepper, supra note 7, at 247. (Emphasis added.)
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Company stock,9 the applicability of the exemption to a pledgee's sale
of collateral was ripe for judicial determination. 0 On appeal Santa
Monica Bank and the Southwest Bank of Inglewood contended that
they were exempt from the registration requirements since they had
acted in good faith and, as bona fide pledgees, were entitled on default
to sell the collateral without registration." This assumption that "good
faith" in accepting the stock was a sufficient defense was repudiated by
the court:
" 178 F. Supp. 4.18 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). It is noteworthy that this proceeding,
before Sylvester J. Ryan, U.S.D.J., involved a hearing of some two and a half days
length. Preliminary injunctions in the ordinary case issue upon the mere filing of
affidavits.
10 Up to this point the uncertain status of the bona fide pledgee under the Securities
Act aroused little concern since private interests had been unaffected. Legislative history
records that the Securities Act, as proposed to Congress and as originally passed by the
Senate, expressly exempted sales in liquidation by a pledgee of securities taken in good
faith as collateral for a bona fide debt. This exemption was subsequently eliminated
from the Act as passed, which alone suggests a legislative intent to require registration.
A more encompassing analysis, however, apparently contributed much to an early
understanding to the contrary. Throop & Lane, supra note i, at I24 n. 103. See Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 333 n. 99 (195 ). Although admitting that the definition of
the term "underwriter," if torn from its context, is broad enough to include the
pledgee who, although not in a position to compel registration, finds it necessary in the
collection of his debt--b utilize the usual channels of distribution, Throop and Lane
wrote at iz4. thatts consideration "from a functional point of view would without
doubt lead a court to conclude that a bonra fide pledgee in such a situation is not to be
regarded as an underwriter." The viewpoint of these two former General Counsels
of the Commission was thoroughly considered on oral argument to the court.
Appellants also cited the Court of Appeals to Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION at 333.
Brief for Appellants, p. 8. There, Loss states that a bonr fide gift is not a sale and that
"the Commission has taken the same position with respect to pledges and loans of
securities." The footnote reference thereto refers only to loans. The Court of Appeals,
however, noted Loss's own opinion on page 346. 279 F.zd 485, 490 (zd Cir. 196o).
Here, he states that "it would hardly be logical to consider [a pledgee who takes
securities from the issuer as collateral for a loan] to be an underwriter unless the entire
pledge arrangement was a subterfuge."
" Brief for Appellants, pp. 7-15. Appellant banks also contended that they did not
"purchase" within the meaning of § 2(11). See note z supra. The court held, how-
ever, that although the term is not defined in the Act, it should be interpreted in a
manner complementary to "sale" which is defined in § 2(3) as including "every . . .
disposition of . . . a security or interest in a security, for value . .. ."
The contention that the banks did not deal directly with the issuer, Guild Films
Company, was in turn rejected, for the Second Circuit had recently stated that "the
underlying policy of the Act, that of protecting the investing public through the dis-
closure of adequate information, would be seriously impaired if . . . a dealer must have
conventional or contractual privity with the issuer in order to be an 'underwriter'. "
SEC v. Culpepper, 27o F.zd 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1959), following SEC v. Chinese Consol.
Benev. Ass'n, zo F.zd 738 (zd Cir. 194).
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[T] he statute does not impose such a "good faith" criterion. The exemption
in § 4 (i) was intended to permit private sales of unregistered securities to
investors who are likely to have, or who are likely to obtain, such information
as is ordinarily disclosed in registration statements .... The "good faith" of
the banks is irrelevant to this purpose. It would be of little solace to pur-
chasers of worthless stock to learn that the sellers had acted "in good faith."
Regardless of good faith, the banks engaged in steps necessary to this public
sale, and cannot be exempted.'"
Registration is required, therefore, where the securities to be sold are
transferred by a debtor who would otherwise be required to effect
registration and taken by a creditor with the specific intention that they
be distributed in order to obtain repayment of the loan. Registration
may even be required in the ordinary collateral situation, where dis-
closure is in the interest of the public and for the protection of investors.
Regardless of the "good faith" of the creditor, if he is a participant in
a public offering, he is an "underwriter" within the statutory definition
of that term. The intervention of a pledge transaction, even if bona
fide, does not absolve those upon whom Congress has imposed the duty
of disclosure.
In the light of this development of the law, to return to the initially
stated example, could the X Bank be prevented from publicly dis-
posing of the Z bonds which it holds as collateral for a loan by Cor-
poration Y, which is in default, if Corporation Z refuses to register?
It is unquestioned that neither the issuer, Corporation Z, nor one
in control of the issuer, Corporation Y, could lawfully dispose of
the bonds, except in a nonpublic offering, absent their effective registra-
tion. The intervention of the X Bank in the distribution process
apparently offers no basis for a different statutory consequence. Regard-
less of its "good faith," X Bank would be a participant in a public
offering and hence an "underwriter." Z's refusal to register the bonds
necessarily limits X Bank, which is technically and economically pro-
hibited from effecting registration itself, to nonpublic attempts at dis-
position.
Apparently, the only recourse a lending institution has where the
borrower offering unregistered securities as collateral is the issuer, a
person in control of the issuer (Y Corporation), or a person who bought
from either of them,"3 is to insist on registration at the time of making
1279 F.zd 485, 490 (2d Cir. z96o).
"If the borrower is neither the issuing corporation nor a person having any relation
to the issuer, no problem of registration is involved.
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the loan 4 or to require a commitment that, upon default, registra-
tion will then be effected." 5 The implications of extending the rigidi-
ties of the registration process to this aspect of corporation finance, how-
ever, will require careful study by the SEC before a program of enforce-
ment is seriously undertaken. The nature and purpose of these loans,
which are generally secured by the issues of subsidiaries pledged to
finance the acquisition of new subsidiaries, the credit prospects for small
businesses for whom registration may not be feasible, and the potential
loss to the banking community of legitimate, though marginal, banking
business, are weighty considerations.
Certainly in principle this broad, expansive view of the Securities
Act registration requirement, taken by a court that could not have been
unmindful of its practical implications, should be sustained. In render-
ing the criterion of "good faith" irrelevant, the court corrected any mis-
conception that the Securities Act was designed to impose penalties on
male fides. Registration is not, after all, a penalty. It is simply the
means adopted "to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of in-
formation... necessary to informed investment decisions."'" Thus, the
SEC's interpretation of the Act's demands, which has again found favor
with the Second Circuit, is understandable:
The congressional mandate of disclosure to investors is not to be set aside to
permit a public distribution of non-registered securities because a creditor de-
sires to collect a loan by selling collateral. There is no warrant for sub-
ordinating the public interest to this private interest, whether or not the credi-
tor acted in good faith.' 7
Throop & Lane, supra note i x.
' Brief for SEC in opposition to petition for writ of certiorari, p. 7 n. 6.
"'SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (953).
" Brief for SEC in opposition to petition for writ of certiorari, pp. 6-7.
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